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America’s Racial Stain:
The Taint Argument and the Limits of Constitutional Law and Rhetoric
Louis Michael Seidman*
“Nothing lasts, and yet nothing passes, either. And nothing passes just because nothing lasts.”1

I.

Introduction

How should reformers respond to America’s racial stain? The problem is more complex
than many imagine. Political activists usually attempt to promote change by taking advantage
of a gap between current reality and a touchstone they use to measure the normative
desirability of that reality. But what if the touchstone itself is infected by the reality that
activists want to change?
Consider first the Constitution. For much of our history, social movements have
resorted to constitutional law and rhetoric as a foundation grounding campaigns for reform. 2
That history creates a problem: If critique of the status quo is deep enough to erode the moral
standing of the Constitution itself, then reformers destroy the substrate on which the critique
rests. There is no simple way for a document born in original sin to cleanse itself of its own
impurity.
The problem runs deeper. The Constitution serves as a symbol of the broader American
experience. At the beginning, our country was stained white. On one telling of our national
story, the stain has colored all our history. If the telling is accurate, then purging the stain
requires destroying the American ethos. Before we can achieve real political progress, we must
explode the self-glorifying myth American exceptionalism. Yet the very effort to come to
terms with our real history undermines the normative basis for our rebirth.
Questions raised by these problems do not lend themselves to definitive answers, and
this essay does not offer them. Instead, I suggest a variety of responses that attempt to grapple
with the difficulty. I also offer tentative assessments of whether they can do so successfully.
Least promising, I argue, are responses grounded in constitutional law understood as judicial
*
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parsing of constitutional text and precedent. This social practice is too deeply mired in a
pernicious history, set of conventions, and restraints to pull itself out of its own muck.
Political redemption offers more promise. Tactics used outside the courthouse that
invoke the vaguer, higher ideals supposedly implicit in constitutional text and that reimagine
and reconstruct our history in a more favorable light might provide a foundation for renewal.
But the effective use of these tactics requires extraordinary political and rhetorical skill that no
one on the current scene has yet demonstrated. Perhaps more importantly, it also requires a
willingness of Americans, also yet to be demonstrated, to follow such a leader toward racial
reconciliation.
II.

The Cultural and Historical Problem

As an entry point into the problem, imagine that Washington DC somehow realizes its
long-time ambition to become a state. What should the new state be called? Clearly not
“Washington, District of Columbia.” The only acceptable part of that name is the word “of.”
Early versions of DC statehood bills labeled it “New Columbia,”3 as did a draft of the new state’s
constitution.4 But that name is also unacceptable. Christopher Columbus was at a minimum a
brutal enslaver and possibly a genocidal maniac.5 Making “Columbia” “New” doesn’t extirpate
the crimes of the old Columbus any more than a “New Hitleria” would cleanse Hitler’s crimes.
HR 51, the first bill providing for DC statehood to pass either House of Congress, names
the new state “Washington, Douglass Commonwealth.”6 That gets rid of Columbus and cleverly
preserves the “Washington, DC” label by changing the words that D and C abbreviate.
Unfortunately, though, it accomplishes these goals at the cost of considerable awkwardness.
The name would inevitably be shortened to “Washington,” but we already have a state so
named. The more serious problem is that the bill asks DC’s black residents to accept a name
honoring a man who enslaved their ancestors.
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The Bill’s authors apparently thought the unacceptable implications of the naming could
be avoided by balancing George Washington with Frederick Douglass, an authentic hero who
was a DC resident and had once been the DC recorder of deeds.7 But balancing a white
slaveholder with a black abolitionist and calling it a day is morally repulsive. It suggests that a
compromise equally honoring our nation’s racist and liberatory past is acceptable. It isn’t.8
Controversy about monuments, statues, and patriotic songs presents another version of
the same difficulty. Consider first our National Anthem. The poem that provides its lyrics was
written by Francis Scott Key, a slave owner9 who used his legal acumen to prosecute
abolitionists for libel.10 The third verse proclaimed that
No refuge could save
The hireling and slave
From the terror of flight
Or the gloom of the grave. 11
The apparent reference is to the dire fate that Key envisioned for enslaved African
Americans who rushed to British battle lines in search of freedom. Without apparent irony, Key
concludes the stanza by proclaiming that
the star-spangled banner
In triumph doth wave
O'er the land of the free
And the home of the brave.12
The context makes apparent whose freedom Key cared about and whose home he was
describing. Is it any wonder, then, that some defenders of racial justice refuse to stand when
the song is sung? Still, we can understand and applaud their actions while also wondering
whether our fragile politics can withstand a campaign to dethrone this supposed symbol of
national unity.
Monuments and statues that glorify traitors and racists pose a similar problem. It
should be obvious that these structures deserve no place in our public iconography, but
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opponents of the iconoclasts ask, “where is the stopping point.” It is not as easy as it might
seem to dismiss their concern.
Consider, for example, the people memorialized by the most important monuments in
Washington, DC. When George Washington went to Philadelphia where he presided over the
Constitutional Convention, he was accompanied by the enslaved William (Billy) Lee, whom
Washington had purchased for 61 pounds, 15 shillings. Lee waited on Washington hand and
foot.13 For years, Thomas Jefferson ran what amounted to a slave labor camp at Monticello. He
repeatedly impregnated the enslaved Sally Hemmings, the half-sister of his wife.14 Abraham
Lincoln endorsed a constitutional amendment that would have permanently protected
slavery.15 Until nearly the end of his life, he believed that African Americans could never coexist
with whites and favored various crackpot schemes to rid the country of them.16 Should we
destroy the Washington Monument and Lincoln and Jefferson memorials?
The controversy over names and statues might be thought to create no more than a
trivial embarrassment. Perhaps it is an example of our unfortunate preoccupation with
symbolism at the expense of substance. But confining the problem to statutes, songs, and
monuments seriously understates the sweep of the claims made by iconoclasts. On their
account, the nation’s entire history is tainted by racism and oppression. Instead of an
aberration, Trumpism is only the latest manifestation of our founding and permanent
commitment to white supremacy. The Revolutionary War, the drafting of the Constitution,
the settling of the West, the Jacksonian Revolution, the Progressive movement, the New Deal,
the Nixon presidency, and the Reagan renewal are all colored by America’s racial stain.
Arguably, it even infects modern American attitudes toward the war in Ukraine where we have
been much more responsive to the suffering of white Christians than we were to the suffering
of, for example, victims of genocide and mass slaughter in Rwanda, Yemen, Myanmar, and
South Sudan.
13
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Of course, there are other ways to characterize our history. I discuss these possibilities
below. But suppose at least provisionally that the account is right, or even partially right. If
America’s racial stain has always been white then the iconoclastic projects risk the effacement
of our history as well as all the statues, monuments, literature, and songs that glorify it. The
projects suggest that we must disown both our Constitution (the document) and our
constitution (our ontological status). Is that an undertaking that we could or should pursue in
the name of the very Constitution and constitution that we are attempting to displace?
In the sections below, I explore this question first with regard to judicially enforceable
constitutional law and then with regard to constitutionally tinged rhetoric as it operates in the
political sphere.
III.

The Problem for Courts

America’s racial stain inevitably produces disruptions, tensions, and contradictions in
standard constitutional doctrine that, in theory, social activists might exploit. A generation of
critical legal scholars tried to act on this theory. Many of them believed as an article of faith
that the deconstructive project would open space for a politics that was more humane, equal,
decent, and just.
With the benefit of years of difficult experience, there is now solid reason to doubt that
deconstruction can achieve this objective. There are two versions of the theory. On the first
account, the contradictions could encourage timid judges to see that they had a choice about
how to formulate legal doctrine. Judges would then use that freedom to support progressive
change. On the second version, pointing out contradiction and incoherence could lay the
groundwork for discrediting the very enterprise of liberal constitutionalism so that it could be
replaced with a more just legal structure.
Perhaps the jury is still out on the second claim (more on this below), but in retrospect, the
first claim seems impossibly naïve. The claim rests on a radical misunderstanding of the kinds
of people who become judges and a radical underestimation of the resilience and flexibility of
legal doctrine. The very indeterminacy that Critical Legal Studies emphasized means that
judges have a limitless capacity to squirm out of embarrassing corners by the recharacterizing
or overruling precedent, reframing factual and temporal assumptions, exploiting the ambiguity
of relevant text, or simply and willfully ignoring or obfuscating contradiction.
The discussion that follows provides a brief case study of this phenomenon in the context
of America’s racial stain. It documents both the discontinuities produced by the taint argument
and the tactics that have been and will be employed to soften or obscure those discontinuities.
A. Using the Racial Stain Argument to Force Change in Doctrine
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1. The Problem. The doctrinal problem begins with Washington v. Davis,17 where the Court
held that a facially neutral government policy need not be strictly scrutinized even if it had a
disproportionate racial effect. The Court’s opinion surprisingly and candidly acknowledges the
racial stain problem exemplified above by the difficulties posed when we contemplate a new
name for DC, abandoning the National Anthem, or removing public art. The Davis Court
thought that the results of an effects test “would be far reaching and would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes.”18
For proponents of the racial taint theory, that is just the point: The tendrils of American
racism are pervasive and getting rid of racial hierarchy and white privilege “root and branch”19
requires revolutionary change. For the Davis majority though, the very fact that an effects test
would require such change meant that the Court had to reject the test. The Justices seem to
have thought that constitutional law necessarily operated at the margins, smoothing the rough
edges of our practices and traditions, but not requiring their transformation. That view, in turn,
entails living with a contradiction. On the one hand, we have the official story that insists that
racial hierarchy is unconstitutional and unacceptable. But on the other, when the effort to
eliminate racial hierarchy is “far reaching” and would raise “serious questions” about
established institutions and practices, hierarchy is both constitutional and acceptable.
But although Davis attempted to cabin the taint argument, it did not completely reject
it. The Court reaffirmed long standing doctrine subjecting to strict scrutiny statutes that facially
discriminated on a racial basis, apparently even if they do not have a current, racially
disproportionate effect. More significantly, it made clear that even if a statute or policy was
facially neutral, it would trigger strict scrutiny if it was enacted for a racist purpose.
If the Court thought that this compromise effectively eliminated the revolutionary
potential of the taint argument, it was sadly mistaken. The mistake becomes apparent when
one examines the implications of Hunter v. Underwood20 – a case that applied the “intent” test
to invalidate a statute. Hunter, decided in 1985, concerned a provision of the Alabama
Constitution, adopted eighty-four years earlier. The provision disfranchised all persons
convicted of “crimes of moral turpitude” and the legislative history left no doubt that it was
enacted for the purpose of restricting the voting rights of African Americans. Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist treated as irrelevant questions about whether the law
currently served a legitimate purpose or remained on the books for non-racial reasons. Even if
those facts were true, the Court held that the provision must be invalidated because of the
motivation of the people who enacted it years ago.21

17
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If the claims some people make about our racial stain are accurate, then the potential
implications of Hunter are breathtaking. There can be no doubt that slavery helped shape the
Constitution itself. As historian Donald Robinson has written, “The South’s enthusiastic
participation in the nationalizing thrust of 1787 carried one portentous qualification: the
national government could be as powerful as the vision of a great national empire demanded,
provided that it keep its hands off slavery.”22 The compromises the Framers made with the
motive of satisfying slaveholders are well known and affect virtually every aspect of American
government.23 Later amendments reversed some of the most egregious coddling of slavery,
including the three-fifths compromise24 and the requirement that free states return escaped
enslaved people.25 The ban on the importation of slaves until 180826 expired according to its
own terms. But other vital provisions remain. They include protections for states’ rights
contained in the Tenth Amendment,27 the shape of the federal taxation power,28 the grant of
federal power to mobilize the militia to put down insurrections,29 the protection for property
rights,30 the ban on congressional export taxes,31 the electoral college system,32 and the
allocation of treaty-making and appointment powers partially to the President rather than
entirely to the Senate.33 Judicial enforcement of any of these provisions implicates modern
generations in our nation’s racist past.
I will have more to say below about the status of the Constitution, but even if disowning
it is off the table, there are many subconstitutional statutes and policies that are vulnerable if
we take Hunter seriously. Some examples:
1. Some claim that police forces have their origins in the slave patrols tasked with
capturing escaped enslaved persons and returning them to their former condition. 34
The claim may be exaggerated or overly simple, but there can be no denying that a
major motivation for having and expanding police forces was the felt need to control
African Americans.

22
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26
Id. at Art I, sec. 9, cl. 1
27
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29
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30
Id. at Amend. V.
31
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32
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33
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34
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2. Many of our drug laws were enacted because of racist fears of supposedly drugcrazed Asian and African Americans.35
3. Conservative scholars have demonstrated that early progressive measures like
minimum wage and maximum hours laws were enacted to suppress competition
from African American workers.36 The Davis-Bacon Act, requiring contractors to pay
the local prevailing wage to workers at federally funded construction projects, was
passed for racist reasons.37 Federal home mortgage policy deliberately promoted
residential segregation.38 More broadly, much of the New Deal was racially
gerrymandered to help white, but not black, workers.39
4. The location of highways, public housing, public schools, and other public works
projects was strongly influenced by the racial composition of neighborhoods in
which they were located.40
5. Our immigration laws were enacted with the express purpose of controlling the
ethnic composition of the country. The very criteria for membership in our political
community – who counts as Americans – is therefore racially stained in both senses
of the word. The 1965 immigration act ended some of the most egregious aspects
of this policy, but not all of them, and the effort to control the flow of immigrants
remains motivated at least in part by racist assumptions that go back to the
beginning of restrictionist legislation.41
6. Early gun control measures were apparently motivated by fears of what would
happen if African Americans were armed.42
7. Many argue that the death penalty, which has been abolished in most of the world,
survives only because of its disproportionate effect on African Americans.43
Unfortunately, these specific examples are just the beginning of the problem. For
example, they leave out the pervasive effects sexist assumptions and outright misogyny have
had on our legal architecture. Discrimination against and exploitation of Hispanics and Asians
are well documented and have had a profound effect on our history. And what are we to make
of the treatment of American Indians? The country’s entire history is premised on their
displacement, subjugation, and elimination.
35

See, e.g., Desmond Manderson, Symbolism and Racism in Drug History and Policy, 18 Drug & Alcohol Rev.
179 (1999).
36
See David Bernstein, Only One Place of Redress: African Americans, Labor Regulation, and the Courts
from Reconstruction to the New Deal (2001).
37
See David Bernstein, The Davis-Bacon Act: Vestige of Jim Crow, 13 Natl. Back L.J. 276 (1994).
38
See Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: The Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated
America (2017).
39
See Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Times (2013).
40
See note 38, supra.
41
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Laws, ___ Ind. L. Rev. ___ (2021).
42
See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist
Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L. J. 309 (1991).
43
See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment 108-115 (2016).
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More generally, specific examples fail to capture the true radicalism of the Hunter
approach. To fully vindicate Hunter’s promise, we must imagine what our society would look
like if we had never had laws enforcing slavery, if Reconstruction had succeeded, if there had
never been a Jim Crow regime, if different people had immigrated to the United States, and if
Indians had not been slaughtered and displaced. That means ceding to judges the authority to
imagine and put into place a wholly different country. Could it be that the Constitution requires
this outcome?
2. Offramps.
There was a moment in American history when the eradication of America’s racial stain
might have been possible. After the Civil War Union troops occupied the South and Radical
Republicans controlled Congress. At least some Radical Republicans wanted to remake
America’s racial order.
But we all know that that effort failed. As Eric McKittrick has pointed out,44 the South,
unlike post-World War II Germany and Japan, was never made to accept defeat. The South
never became a subjugated enemy subject to the will of the prevailing power. Instead, from
the beginning, powerful forces in the North were all too ready for reconciliation and
“redemption.” Far from mandating radical reconstruction, federal courts used constitutional
law as an instrument to frustrate it. The upshot, historian Heather Cox Richardson claims, is
that the South eventually won the Civil War. 45
There are many reasons why the victors in 1865 behaved differently from the victors
in 1945. Perhaps the principal one is that Allied forces in World War II came from the outside.
Germany and Japan had not been part of the United States or the United Kingdom. They did
not share a common history or culture. For that reason, the problem of shared responsibility
did not arise. In contrast, America’s racial stain was not limited to the South. It was and is built
into our common history. Extirpating it meant dealing with problems in the North as well as the
South.
In any event, whether or not radical reconstruction was possible in 1865, it pretty
clearly is impossible now, especially if one imagines it emanating from judicially enforced
constitutional doctrine. The progress that was made after the Civil War came about largely
because there were troops on the ground and, as noted above, despite, rather than because of
the efforts of judges to enforce constitutional law. Today, there are no troops on the ground
and no prostrate and defeated enemy begging for mercy.

44

See Eric L. McKittrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction 31-35 (1960).
Heather Cox Richardson, How the South Won the Civil War: Oligarchy, Democracy, and the Continuing
Fight for the Soul of America (2020).
45
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The notion of the modern Supreme Court leading a campaign of radical
reconstruction is fanciful to say the least. But worse than that, and more surprisingly, judicially
led reconstruction is probably also undesirable. The last thing racial progressives should want is
a conservative Court trying to imagine and put in place a reconstructed society conforming to
its conception of what we would have been if we had had a different history. And even if the
court were somehow transformed (and how would that happen?), prior experience strongly
suggests that judicially enforced constitutional law is not up to the task of radical
reconstruction. The most liberal Supreme Court in our history – the Warren Court – mostly
failed. 46 Certainly, the modern Court is not about to lead us to a promised land. For these
reasons, the courts need to, have, will, and should find off-ramps to escape Hunter’s
implications.
To understand these off ramps, we must begin by making some analytic distinctions.
It turns out that there are two different taint arguments.47 On some occasions, “taint” refers to
a but-for causal connection between prior acts of unconstitutional discrimination and a current
state of affairs. Perhaps, for example, a city exhibits a pattern of housing segregation, and this
segregation can be traced to discriminatory government decisions, made years earlier
concerning the availability of government backed mortgages.48 On other occasions, “taint”
refers to the genealogy of a statute or policy. Perhaps a statute was enacted decades ago for a
discriminatory purpose. If the statute remains on the books years later, or if it has been
replaced by a subsequent statute that closely tracks its predecessor, the earlier statute or policy
might be thought to “taint” the later one.49
Matters are further complicated by different understandings of the prior
“discriminatory purpose” that putatively infects current policy. Sometimes, the illicit purpose is
a desire to harm or denigrate a disfavored group simply for the purpose of making things worse
for members of the group.50 The possibility of this sort of discriminatory purpose lies behind
the strict scrutiny afforded statutes or policies that facially discriminate against protected

46

The Warren Court’s most famous racial project was school desegregation, but nine years after Brown, it
had achieved virtually no integration in the Deep South. When integration finally came, the efficient cause was
forceful action by the Johnson administration, rather than by the courts. And even then, the abolition of de jure
segregation failed to dismantle the country’s racial hierarchy. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring about Social Change (2d ed. 2008).
47
See W. Kerrel Murray, Discriminatory Taint, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 1203-04 (2022) (distinguishing between
different “taint” arguments).
48
See Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: The Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated
America (2017).Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 499, 530 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (tying
inability of minority owned Richmond construction firms to win government contracts to pattern of nationwide
discrimination).
49
See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
50
See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 417 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“if the constitutional conception
of ‘equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest”); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“We conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative
end but to make them unequal to everyone else”).
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classes, but it might also play a role in finding that facially neutral policies are tainted by an
unconstitutional purpose.
The second kind of purpose often also involves a desire to harm a disfavored group,
but that desire is not a necessary component of the prohibited purpose. Instead, the purpose is
defined by the desire to produce the same result that facial discrimination would produce but
to do so by facially neutral means. Put differently, the purpose is to use a facially neutral
statute or policy with the aim of producing a disproportionate racial effect.51
The Supreme Court has pretty much shut down the possibility of making the first
sort of taint argument. It has repeatedly held that what it calls general “societal discrimination”
resulting from prior unconstitutional acts is insufficient to require remedy. Indeed, a remedy for
“societal discrimination” is not even permitted when it takes the form of race-based
preferences.52 Instead, remedies are available only when there is a direct causal link between
a discrete discriminatory act and an identifiable, personal injury.53 The fact that our country
has been stained white throughout its history will therefore be unavailing for plaintiffs
complaining about modern racial hierarchy.
The second kind of taint argument, involving the genealogy of various statutes and
government policies, poses a more difficult problem. At least in theory, Hunter requires
invalidation of prior statutes that taint currently applicable statutes and policies. As the
examples discussed above illustrate, there is no shortage of current statutes and policies that
might be vulnerable if this command were taken literally.
How might courts avoid taking Hunter’s command literally? The cleanest solution
would be to overrule Hunter. Disowning the case is not without attraction. Why, after all
should the motives and purposes of people long dead matter today? If a statute currently has
a neutral or salutary impact and if it is no longer supported for racist reasons, why should its
pedigree matter? Why should identical statutes be constitutional or unconstitutional because
of the reasons why people supported them?
Moreover, the effort to sort out the motives or purposes of actors is famously
fraught and, perhaps, altogether incoherent. Different people have different motives that they
might not fully understand themselves. They usually don’t tell us what these motives are, and
many legislators and voters act without clear understandings of what they are voting for or how
what they are voting for will intersect with unanticipated social conditions years later.
51

See, e.g., Gomillion v. Luightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (striking down facially neutral districting where aim
was to deny African Americans the right to vote).
52
See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 262, 274 (1986); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
53
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (rejecting race-based measures to remedy general
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More broadly, a repudiation of Hunter might mark a first step toward shifting the
conversation from the past to the future and from imposing blame to finding solutions. On this
view, preoccupation with the worst aspects of our history is a poor strategy for achieving social
justice. People inevitably react defensively when asked to disown their national identity or
when blamed for misdeeds committed by past generations. A more fruitful strategy for
removing our racial stain is to reconstruct our history in a more positive way or, alternatively, to
disregard it and start afresh.
But as attractive as overruling Hunter might seem, an overlapping consensus between
the left and the right stands in the way of that outcome.
The first problem is that an outright overruling would permit the continued
enforcement of racist laws, thereby undermining the prevailing ideology of racial neutrality. If
the Court upheld statutes deliberately gerrymandered to disadvantage racial minorities, it
would be publicly declaring that racial discrimination is constitutionally permissible. It is one
thing to leave our racial hierarchy in place; it is another to overtly endorse it.
Moreover, Hunter remains helpful to both progressives and conservatives when used
judiciously and instrumentally to mount attacks on the outer defensive perimeters of our
racialized politics. Writing for conservatives and progressives alike, Justice Gorsuch recently
used the racial taint argument to discredit Louisiana’s statute permitting nonunanimous jury
verdicts in criminal cases54 – a point reinforced by Justice Sotomayor’s separate concurrence.55
Conservatives have used the taint argument to discredit gun control legislation56 and a variety
of progressive reforms, most prominently the Davis-Bacon Act, which mandates payment of the
locally prevailing wage for federally funded construction projects.57 Overruling Hunter might
also complicate conservative reliance on illicit purposes to invalidate laws supposedly impinging
upon the free exercise rights of religious conservatives.58 For their part, progressives continue
to use of the taint argument to attack voting restrictions,59 segregated educational
institutions,60 and a variety of police practices.61
But perhaps the strongest reason for preserving Hunter is that there is no need to
overrule it. Why incur the disruption and ideological cost of disowning the case when the
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justices can easily avoid its implications whenever it threatens to extend beyond the perimeters
and into the heart of the racial status quo?
Judges can use and have used a variety of off-ramps to avoid its implications. As W.
Kerrel Murray writes, the Supreme Court has often greeted with Hunter-type arguments with
an answer that “resembles a shrug.”62 For example, in Trump v. Hawaii,63 where the Court
upheld the third iteration of President Trump’s travel ban, it treated as essentially irrelevant the
earlier iterations, which lower courts found were infected with a discriminatory purpose.
Similarly, in McCleskey v. Kemp,64 where the Court upheld Georgia’s death penalty against
charges of racial discrimination, the justices summarily dismissed arguments that capital
punishment was originally instituted in Georgia for overtly discriminatory reasons.65
For courts unsatisfied with a mere “shrug,” there are numerous analytic tools available
to avoid Hunter’s force. The simplest is to deny that there was a racial motivation in the first
place. On a few occasions, discriminatory motivation might be inferred from discriminatory
impact, but in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,66 the
Court declared that “such cases are rare.”67 In the more usual case, “impact alone is not
determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.”68
The Hunter Court itself acknowledged that examining this evidence is a “problematic
undertaking”69 and quoted a passage from United States v. O’Brien acknowledging that “[w]hat
motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates
scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.” 70
Hunter was unusual because the candor and shamelessness exhibited by proponents of the law
meant that no guesswork was required. More often, the law’s proponents will be more
discreet. For understandable reasons, even justices sympathetic to the underlying claim are
reluctant to accuse public officials of racism and bad faith.
The Court’s recent treatment of illicit purpose in the related context of anti-abortion
legislation illustrates the point. In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellersted,71 the Court
confronted a Texas statute imposing a variety of restrictions on abortion clinics including a
requirement that doctors working at the clinics have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals
and that the facilities meet the exacting standards for surgical centers.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer recited in detail evidence indicating that the
restrictions had no relationship to protecting the health of pregnant women. One might have
supposed that this fact taken together with facts about Texas politics known to any informed
observer would have led to the conclusion that the statutory scheme had the “purpose . . . of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus,”72 thereby violating the “undue burden” standard announced in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.73 But, perhaps out of concern for the implicit rules of
etiquette in constitutional litigation, even the Court’s liberals were unprepared to accuse Texas
legislators of deliberate subterfuge. This reluctance was not without cost. It forced the Court’s
majority into a tortured, contingent, and time-bound inquiry into the actual effects of the
statutory scheme.
At least abortion law has an effects prong that allowed the Court to invalidate the Texas
statute without resort to a purpose inquiry. But Washington v. Davis forecloses resort
constitutional arguments based on mere discriminatory effect in the racial context. The result
is that opponents of laws with discriminatory impact have no constitutional recourse when
courts are unwilling to find discriminatory purpose.
Consider, for example, Johnson v. Governor of the State of Florida,74 where the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit declined to find a discriminatory purpose
behind a felon disfranchisement law enacted by a Florida constitutional convention in 1868.
The constitution resulted from the victory of “moderate” Republicans who insisted on the
disfranchisement provision over “radical Republicans” who opposed it.75 The court
acknowledged that the convention as a whole was permeated by “an unfortunate and
indefensible racial animus”76 that “racial discrimination may have motivated certain other
provisions in Florida's 1868 Constitution”77 and that “a few isolated remarks”78 by delegates
suggested that a discriminatory purpose motivated the disfranchisement provision. But the
court nonetheless concluded that “[t]he existence of racial discrimination behind some
provisions of Florida's 1868 Constitution does not . . . establish that racial animus motivated the
criminal disenfranchisement provision.” 79 Accordingly, it refused to invalidate the provision. A
court that was unable to detect a racial purpose shared by delegates obsessed with racism and
bigotry, is not likely to find it in the more usual case where legislators are more subtle and
discreet.
Suppose that evidence of a discriminatory purpose is so strong that it cannot be ignored
or denied. Even in these circumstances, other off ramps remain open. In Hunter, Justice
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Rehnquist cited to his own prior opinion in Mount Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,80
which held that even if an illicit purpose is a “substantial” motivating factor for government
action, defenders of the action could nonetheless prevail if they proved that it had not been the
“but-for” cause of the action. In the context of legislative districting, the Court has held that
even but-for causation is insufficient. Instead, facially neutral districting is unconstitutional only
if it “is so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race.”81
Finding an unconstitutional racial purpose is made still more difficult by the distinction
between two types of purposes discussed above.82 Standing alone, Hunter suggests that the
deliberate use of facial neutrality to produce the same result that would have resulted from a
facially discriminatory policy is a sufficiently discriminatory. But the Court’s earlier decision in
Personnel Administration of Massachusetts v. Feeney,83 upholding a facially neutral veteran’s
preference in state hiring that had a radically disproportionate gender effect, throws some
doubt on this understanding. The Court held that discriminatory purpose meant “more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness or consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of’ not merely ‘in
spite of’ its adverse effects on an identifiable group.”84
While this language is hardly free from ambiguity, it at least suggests that something like
the second sort of intent – a deliberate desire to harm the disfavored group for the sake of
harming it – is required. After all, Massachusetts intended to produce the disproportionate
impact of the veteran’s preference in the sense that it instituted the policy with full knowledge
that it would have this impact. But because Massachusetts was not motivated by a desire to
harm women for the sake of harming them, the program survived constitutional scrutiny.
Even when this narrow version of discriminatory purpose plainly caused the government
action and even when the action is “unexplainable on grounds other than race,” opponents of
action are still not home free. In Coleman v. Miller,85 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to the Georgia state flag modeled after the
Confederate battle flag. The court acknowledged that the flag design was “adopted during a
regrettable period in Georgia’s history when its public leaders were implementing a campaign
of massive resistance to the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings.”86 The flag bill was
enacted as part of a package that also declared that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v.
Board of Education was null and void.87 The court did not deny that the flag design was
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adopted for discriminatory reasons. It hardly could. Yet it refused to outlaw the flag because, it
held, plaintiffs had not demonstrated that its display had a racially discriminatory effect.88
Finally, suppose that discriminatory purpose and effect are clearly established. Courts
have held that later reenactment of an identical provision can purge the primary taint, thereby
shielding the statute from challenge.89 But if that is true, suppose that there has been no
reenactment because current legislators are satisfied with the status quo for nonracial reasons?
It is only a short step from holding that a new statute purges the primary taint to holding that
an old statute is constitutional if a modern legislature would have reenacted it for racially
neutral reasons if called upon to do so.
The short of it, then, is that when Hunter threatens to produce change that is “far
reaching,” it is easy for courts to avoid its implications. While I have suggested doctrinal
strategies that courts have or could use for avoidance, the particular strategy hardly matters.
The bottom line is that courts will not and cannot be trapped by legal argument into reaching
results that produce radical change.
It does not follow that the taint argument is completely ineffectual. As I have
suggested above, judges retain the capacity to use the argument selectively and instrumentally
to justify decisions at the margin. Perhaps more significantly, the argument retains some
disruptive potential. As psychoanalysts teach, denial is hard work and is never fully successful.
For all the modern Court’s frantic attempts to paper over our history, the stain inevitably bleeds
through. When it does, the resulting guilt and pain destabilize the myths that protect our selfrespect.
But over many years, courts have shown a capacity to live with and control these
destabilizing forces. They produce embarrassment and discomfort, but not the sort of collapse
that might clear the ground for fundamental change. People who think that legal arguments
alone have the capacity to produce such change have not paid adequate attention to the
lessons of history.
B. Using the Racial Taint Argument to Destabilize the Practice of Constitutional Adjudication
Suppose that we widen our lens and attempt to use the taint argument on the level of
the overall practice of constitutional adjudication rather than on the level of doctrine that the
practice produces. Paradoxically, this more ambitious effort may hold out more chance of
ultimate victory. To be clear, discrediting American constitutionalism is a long-term project
with, at best, uncertain chances of success. For reasons that are outlined below, change is very
unlikely to come from within. Still, this broader project is less vulnerable to doctrinal
manipulation and more likely to produce meaningful change, even if only in the very long run.
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To see how the destabilization might work, consider two of the most reviled cases in the
history of the United States Supreme Court: Dred Scott v. Sandford90 and Johnson v. M’Intosh.91
Whereas Dred Scott demonstrates the taint theory’s subversive potential, Johnson provides
reasons why the potential can be realized only outside the practice that the taint theory
undermines.
1. Dred Scott. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney wrote that even free African Americans
could not be citizens and were not included within the phrase “the people of the United
States.” In perhaps the most infamous passage ever written by a Supreme Court justice, he
stated that African Americans were “altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit.”92
Remarkably, this explosive language is almost always quoted out of context. When the
context is removed, readers can be forgiven for concluding that these were Taney’s own views.
And perhaps they were. Taney, himself, had been a slave holder, although he had emancipated
his slaves. There can be no doubt that he was a racist. Still, the context makes clear that Taney
was not presenting the views as his own. In the paragraph immediately preceding the language
quoted above, he wrote that “[i]t is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in
relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of
the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence and when the Constitution of the
United States was framed and adopted.”93 Taney wanted the reader to understand that he was
not articulating his own views but rather faithfully uncovering what would today be called the
Constitution’s “original public meaning.” He insisted that it
is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice , the polity or
impolity of these laws. The decision on that question belonged to . . . those who formed
the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty of the court is, to interpret the
instrument they have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the subject and to
administer it as we find it, according to its true intent and meaning when it was
adopted.94
Why is Taney almost always quoted out of context? If the view that African Americans
have “no rights which the white man was bound to respect” can be attributed to Taney alone,
then we are left with the disquieting fact that a vicious racist was once Chief Justice of the
United States. That is bad enough, but Taney’s personal faults do not necessarily impeach the
institution that he was part of. If the view must, instead, be attributed to the framers, and if
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judges are duty bound to enforce the view when they decide constitutional cases, then the
legitimacy of American constitutionalism is drawn into question.
As soon as Taney’s language is put into context, ironies abound. First, it turns out that,
if this if not in other respects, Taney and modern taint theorists are allies. Who would have
thought? Both insist that from the beginning, America was stained white and that the stain
pollutes our founding documents. Second, if Taney and taint theorists are right, and if one
accepts originalist methodology, then Dred Scott was rightly decided. If it is in fact the duty of
judges to give effect to the Constitution’s original public meaning without regard to
contemporary moral or political views, and if the American Constitution is in fact stained white,
then Taney was duty bound to enforce the Constitution’s racist requirements. But no one
today is ready to admit that Dred Scott was rightly decided. If Dred Scott is right, then standard
constitutionalism must be wrong.
For just this reason, defenders of standard constitutionalism must either obfuscate
Taney’s position (which they do by quoting him out of context) or attack the evidence
supporting it. Many of the Constitution’s defenders have opted for the second tactic. It is, of
course, possible that Taney and taint theorists alike are wrong about the Constitution’s original
meaning. Modern scholars are divided about the extent to which Taney got the history right;
almost certainly he exaggerated and oversimplified. The debate is complicated by divisions
among originalists about whether original public meaning, original expected application, or
original intent is the relevant touchstone. But even if we acknowledge these complications, it
is nonetheless true that many of Taney’s critics have also exaggerated and oversimplified.
History almost never speaks to us in an unambiguous voice, and there is almost certainly some
truth on both sides. Without attempting here to finally resolve the historical dispute, we can
note four points of interest.
First, in a backhanded way, the frantic and sometimes tendentious efforts by defenders
of standard constitutionalism to prove Taney wrong itself demonstrates the strength of the
taint theory’s subversive potential. They would hardly go to the trouble of quoting him in a
misleading fashion or trying to discredit the evidence on which he relied if they did not believe
that his position put their project at risk.
Second, even if Taney’s historical reconstruction is partially wrong, it still impeaches
standard constitutionalism to the extent that it is right. Perhaps the framers meant to include
African Americans within the phrase “we the people,” or that this was how the words were
publicly understood at the time of the framing. Still, it is relatively uncontroversial that many
other provisions of the Constitution were added to protect the status of slavery. 95 More
broadly, it is beyond dispute that no people of color attended the Constitutional Convention or
participated in ratification of the document. The fact that their views simply did not count goes
a long way toward impeaching the Constitution’s legitimacy.
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Third, suppose -- improbably -- that Taney was entirely wrong. Even then, his point
demonstrates the fragility of modern constitutionalism. That is so because constitutional
obligation then becomes hostage to the claim that he was wrong. Resting on Taney’s mistake
makes constitutional legitimacy contingent on a historical demonstration that the framers
entertained the “right” views about political morality. But many constitutionalists claim that
constitutionalism is important just because it provides a way to abstract from contentious and
unresolvable issues about political morality. If constitutionalists concede that we are obligated
to obey the constitution only when we agree with the view of the Framers, they effectively give
the game away.
Finally, it might be thought that the Dred Scott problem impeaches only originalism and
leaves untouched advocates of more complex, pluralist theories like living constitutionalism. To
the extent that these theories inject contemporary policy and moral considerations into
constitutional analysis, it is true that they escape the problems outlined above. But virtually all
these theories also acknowledge that constitutional text matters and that it is often decisive.
When the text is ambiguous or open textured, perhaps it can be interpreted according to
contemporary norms. But much of the Constitution is neither ambiguous nor open textured,
and, when this is so, living constitutionalists too must come to grips with the taint problem.
2. Johnson. If Dred Scott demonstrates the subversive power of the taint argument,
Johnson v M’Intosh demonstrates why the power must be applied from the outside.
Johnson involved a land dispute between the plaintiff, whose title depended upon the
sale of the land in question by the Piankeshaw Indian Nation, and the defendant, who claimed
title through a grant by the United States. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall held
that Indian tribes lacked the power to convey land to private individuals and that the
defendant’s claim therefore prevailed.96
In so holding, the Court discussed at length rights based upon discovery and conquest
that, in a modern context, provide ample support for the taint argument.97 Like Taney,
Marshall turns out to be an unlikely ally supporting claims made by taint theorists. He expressly
acknowledges that rights based on discovery allocated land between European nations, and
that European law left those nations free to dispose of Indian occupants as they chose. 98 He
makes plain that the very foundations of American government rest on the exercise of this
power.
Also like Taney, Marshall attempts to separate himself from these conclusions. At the
beginning of his analysis, he writes that
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it will be necessary, in pursuing this inquiry, to examine, not singly those principles of
abstract justice, which the Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his
creature man, and which are admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of
civilized nations, whose perfect independence is acknowledged; but those principles
also which our own government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as the
rule for our decision.99
Like Taney’s disclaimers, Marshall’s attempts to avoid responsibility for his own decision
is not completely convincing. He fails to obscure completely his own racist assumptions, which
lie behind his legal conclusion. For example, he excuses America’s failure to treat Indians like
conquered Europeans who, after conquest, are typically integrated into the polity. In the case
of Indians, integration was impossible because, on his view, American Indians were “fierce
savages. . . To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness;
to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible . . . .100
Perhaps, then, what Marshall really lacked was not legal grounding for doing the right
thing, but the perception and courage to free himself from the racist context in which he
worked. Like Taney, and like even abolitionist judges who refused to confront slavery during
the ante bellum period, Marshall ignored the possibility of throwing off the self-imposed
shackles that restrained him.
Yet, for all the racist assumptions behind the opinion, Marshall makes a point that is
hard to deny. He writes:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country
into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and
afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of
the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and
cannot be questioned. However [restrictions on Indian sale of land] may be opposed to
natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that
system under which the country has been settled, [it] certainly cannot be rejected by
Courts of justice.101
With remarkable prescience, this passage captures the dilemma faced by modern taint
theorists: If our racial stain seeps into the core of who we are and where we came from, then
all actions by our government are tainted. Judges cannot at once claim legitimacy for their
decisions and disown the sordid history that provides them with that legitimacy. It follows that
a judge who accepts the taint argument must thereby disclaim the very power he would have
to exercise to remove our racial stain.
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Because judges cannot be expected to at once assert power and undermine the basis on
which the power is asserted, the taint argument, if it works at all, will have to apply pressure
from the outside. People who are not judges and who do not claim power grounded in our
sordid past will have to force judges to relinquish control. The next Part explores whether the
taint argument can contribute to this task.
IV. The Problem for Constitutional Politics
As Marshall’s M’Intosh opinion acknowledges, judicial power is deeply and inevitably
tainted by America’s racial past. At first, it may seem that political actors who are not judges
are not similarly constrained. Advocates who write scholarly books and articles, who contribute
op ed essays to newspapers, who organize political campaigns, or who demonstrate in the
streets do not make claims to power and legitimacy rooted in prior racism and oppression.
Perhaps they can escape American’s racial taint and lead us to authentic reconstruction.
But if our racial stain is as pervasive as taint theorists claim, can political activists really
escape it? Recall that the problem is not just about law. It is about the very essence of the
American experience – about our culture; our baseline, automatic and unthinking assumptions
about ourselves; our history; and, perhaps, our destiny. Can anyone alive and functioning in
the United States escape all of that? The black separatist H. Rap Brown (now Jamil Abudullah
Al-amin) once said that “violence is as American as cherry pie.”102 As much as he might want to
deny it, it is also true that that H. Rap Brown is as American as George Washington.
This dilemma is hardly new. It first emerged more than a century and a half ago.
Radical abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison embraced a nineteenth century version of the taint
argument and used it to insist that there had to be a clean break from the past. Garrison
famously burned a copy of the Constitution on Independence Day and proclaimed that it was
“a covenant with death and an agreement with hell.”103 Other abolitionists argued that the
North should secede from the South.104
At first, Frederick Douglass sided with Garrisonians, but he ultimately changed his mind.
He came to believe – or at least he came to believe that it was instrumentally useful to believe
– that American history and ideals, understood in the right way, provided adequate tools to
fashion reconstruction. Douglass realized that he could not succeed by separating himself from
America. He had to make his story part of America.105
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The same ancient debate divides taint theorists and their opponents today. Often the
debate takes the form of argument between historians about the motivations of historical
actors and the causes of historical events. No doubt, that argument forms part of the dispute,
but it is not all of it and not the most important part. All sophisticated historians understand
that historical narratives are plastic and open to contrasting modern interpretation. Of course,
history is not completely malleable; some historical narratives are simply false. But our national
experience with race is sufficiently complicated and ambiguous to open questions about the
political usefulness of various potential narratives.
When the problem is posed in this more candid fashion, the horns of the dilemma
become clearer. On the one hand, there can be no doubt that “wokeness” has become a
powerful organizing tool. The very label suggests the potential for the taint argument to make
us see things that were previously invisible. It makes sense of forces and outcomes that might
otherwise seem mysterious and disconnected. It provides an organizing principle that
motivates rage and action.
But a lingering worry remains. For all their discontent, and as much as they may not
want to admit it, taint theorists are also part of America’s past and present. Can a political
movement that calls for the repudiation of the very culture from which it emerges possibly
succeed?
“Wokeness” – uncompromising emphasis on how past injustice determines present
distributions of well-being– galvanizes some but alienates many others. To be sure, recent
polling about what has come to be inaccurately called “critical race theory” has more public
support than one might imagine.106 But the majority of those polled are still unfamiliar with the
controversy. When confronted with the actual prospect of disowning all of America’s past,
many Americans react negatively. The unseating of San Francisco school board members who
favored changing the names of some of the city’s schools and results in the Virginia
gubernatorial race where the Republican candidate successfully ran on a platform of resisting
“critical race theory” are troubling signs of things to come.
Taint theory demands that we repudiate the myths, symbols, and stories central to our
national identity. Because many Americans will find it impossible or undesirable to do so, the
theory erects an obstacle to the creation of a long hoped for but rarely achieved cross-racial
coalition of the dispossessed. Such a coalition must emphasize inclusiveness rather than
particular histories and grievances. It must focus on class injustice, rather than race or ethnicity.
It would require transcending rather than dwelling on our past.
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And yet one cannot help wondering whether these criticisms of taint theory reflect the
very unconscious white supremacy that taint theorists see everywhere. After all, different
people in the United States have different histories. For many people of color, American
history is marked by betrayal, brutality, injustice, suffering, terror, and violent death. Why are
we so concerned about asking white Americans to give up on their history and not concerned at
all about asking Americans of color to give up on theirs?
None of this is to say that a cross-racial coalition dedicated to reform is impossible.
Such a coalition may offer the best hope for a truly (re)constructive politics. But how can it be
achieved? Doing so requires somehow fashioning a common history. But is there really a
common history on offer? Optimists imagine that such a history could be forged from a
reimagined version of white history that emphasizes the best of the American experience. One
might, for example, celebrate the stirring rhetoric contained in the preamble to the
Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, or the speeches of
Martin Luther King while downplaying or ignoring the context in which the words were spoken
or the actual beliefs and actions of many of the speakers.
Perhaps this project offers the best hope for racial progress, but no one should suppose
that undertaking the task is without risks. We are too far down the path of division and anger
for the job to be easy. What seems like positive reconstruction to some will seem like a cleaned
up version of white history -- whitewash (in more than one sense) to others.
Can the words “all men are created equal” really inspire when we know that the author
of those words thought that people of color were inherently inferior? How can one celebrate
George Washington’s renunciation of power when his second term ended without noting that
he returned home to a slave plantation? Is it really irrelevant that at the very moment he signed
the Emancipation Proclamation, Abraham Lincoln favored removal of all people of color from
the country?
If a truly common history eludes us, then putting in place an interracial coalition means
somehow building a wall of acoustic separation that allows those motivated by racial taint to
hear the argument while silencing it for others who will be alienated by it. It means using our
national symbols and myths as a foundation for the future even as we discredit the role they
have played in our past. It means simultaneously forgetting and remembering.
Bridging those contradictions requires extraordinary political and rhetorical skills –the
skills that, at least in nascent form, Frederick Douglass exhibited in the nineteenth century.
Perhaps there is another Frederick Douglass just over the horizon, and perhaps there are
people of good will ready to follow her. But for now, we are left with no more than hope for a
salvation that has not yet appeared and may never come.
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